PIPE Dreams? The Performance of Companies Issuing Equity Privately

Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) have become an important source of financing for young, publicly traded firms whose poor operating performance may limit alternative financing options. We propose that firms are motivated to sell these securities to minimize costs associated with asymmetric information. We find that both the security structure and the investor composition of a PIPE security matter in the subsequent performance of the issuing firm. Poor post-issuance performance is associated with securities where investors obtain significant repricing rights, which protect them from future stock price declines. Furthermore, companies that obtain financing from hedge funds tend to under-perform companies that obtain financing from other institutional investors. We argue that hedge funds act as investors of last resort, playing an important role in the market for young, high-risk firms with substantial asymmetric information. Hedge funds are willing to fund such high-risk companies because they can protect against possible price declines in the issuing companies by either negotiating PIPE securities with repricing rights or by entering into short positions of the underlying stocks of the issuing companies.

Enhancing the Benefits for India and Other Developing Countries in the Doha Development Agenda Negotiations

When firms from developed markets acquire firms in emerging markets, marketcapitalization-weighted monthly joint returns show a statistically significant increase of 1.8%. Panel data estimations suggest that the value gains from cross-border M&A transactions stem from the transfer of majority control from emerging-market targets to developed market acquirers—joint returns range from 5.8% to 7.8% when majority control is acquired. Announcement returns for acquirer and target firms estimate the distribution of gains and show a statistically significant increase of 2.4% and 6.9%, respectively. The evidence suggests that the stock market anticipates significant value creation from cross-border transactions that involve emerging-market targets leading to substantial gains for shareholders of both acquirer and target firms.

What Motivates Minority Acquisitions? The Trade-Offs between a Partial Equity Stake and Complete Integration

Minority acquisitions, involving less than 50% of the target, represent a distinct organizational choice. With a minority acquisition, the target can mitigate some of the incentive problems that arise in contractual relationships. Less is known, however, about the trade-off between minority acquisitions and complete integration. We find minority acquisitions are more common when keeping target managerial incentives intact is important and when the target is financially constrained or can benefit from certification. Minority acquisitions are also more likely where the target’s valuation is especially uncertain - integrating internal capital markets will be costly - and consolidating earning will lower EPS

Within-Firm Pay Inequality

Financial regulators and investors have expressed concerns about high pay inequality within firms. Using a proprietary data set of public and private firms, this paper shows that firms with higher pay inequality—relative wage differentials between top- and bottom-level jobs—are larger and have higher valuations and stronger operating performance. Moreover, firms with higher pay inequality exhibit larger equity returns and greater earnings surprises, suggesting that pay inequality is not fully priced by the market. Our results support the notion that differences in pay inequality across firms are a reflection of differences in managerial talent

Essays on Corporate Ownership.

Corporate ownership is one of the most important determinants of modern corporate behavior, affecting firm valuation and productivity. This thesis examines how share ownership influences, or is influenced by, important firm attributes. In the first two chapters, we examine how share ownership influences the mode of acquisition decisions (1st chapter) and firm valuation and productivity (2nd chapter.) In the third chapter, we examine how share ownership is in turn influenced by firm fundamentals, informational asymmetry, and financing constraints by focusing on hedge funds as a source of equity financing.Ph.D.Business AdministrationUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/62406/1/pshelby_1.pd

Acquiring Labor

We present evidence that some firms pursue M&A activity with the objective of obtaining a larger workforce. Firms most likely to be acquired for their large labor force, firms with the largest ex ante employment, are associated with more positive post-merger employment outcomes. Moreover, we find this relation is strongest when acquiring labor outside of an M&A is likely to be most difficult, due to tight labor conditions, or most valuable, in high human capital industries. We further find that high employment target firms are associated with relatively greater post-merger wage increases and lower post-merger employee turnover. We find no evidence that the positive relation between target ex ante employment and ex post employment change is driven by target asset size, market capitalization, industry, profitability or acquirer characteristics. Our findings do not exclude the possibility that a different subset of M&A activity may be motivated to penalize managers who have tolerated over-employment. Indeed, we find evidence consistent with this disciplinary motivation when considering acquisitions of targets in declining industries.

Who Works for Startups? The Relation between Firm Age, Employee Age, and Growth

We present evidence that young employees are an important ingredient in the creation and growth of firms. Our results suggest that young employees possess attributes or skills, such as willingness to take risk or innovativeness, which make them relatively more valuable in young, high growth, firms. Young firms disproportionately hire young employees, controlling for firm size, industry, geography and time. Young employees in young firms command higher wages than young employees in older firms and earn wages that are relatively more equal to older employees within the same firm. Moreover, young employees disproportionately join young firms that subsequently exhibit higher growth and raise venture capital financing. Finally, we show that an increase in the regional supply of young workers increases the rate of new firm creation. Our results are relevant for investors and executives in young, high growth, firms, as well as policymakers interested in fostering entrepreneurship.

Employee Capitalism or Corporate Socialism? Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership

How employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) affect employee compensation and shareholder value depends on the size. Small ESOPs, defined as those controlling less than 5% of outstanding shares, benefit both workers and shareholders, implying positive productivity gains. However, the effects of large ESOPs on worker compensation and shareholder value are more or less neutral, suggesting little productivity gains. These differential effects appear to be due to two non-value-creating motives specific to large ESOPS: (1) To form management-worker alliances ala Pagano and Volpin (2005), wherein management bribes workers to garner worker support in thwarting hostile takeover threats and (2) To substitute wages with ESOP shares by cash constrained firms. Worker compensation increases when firms under takeover threats adopt large ESOPs, but only if the firm operates in a non-competitive industry. The effects on firm valuation also depend on the strength of product market competition: When the competition is strong (weak), most of the productivity gains accrue to employees (shareholders). Competitive industry also implies greater job mobility within the industry, enabling workers to take a greater portion of productivity gains.ESOPs, Employee Incentives, Worker Wages and Compensation, Product Market Competition

A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics LIS Working Paper Series Wage Inequality and Firm Growth Wage Inequality and Firm Growth *

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in February 2015 Abstract We examine how within-firm skill premia-wage differentials associated with jobs involving different skill requirements-vary both across firms and over time. Our firm-level results mirror patterns found in aggregate wage trends, except that we find them with regard to increases in firm size. In particular, we find that wage differentials between high-and either medium-or low-skill jobs increase with firm size, while those between medium-and low-skill jobs are either invariant to firm size or, if anything, slightly decreasing. We find the same pattern within firms over time, suggesting that rising wage inequality-even nuanced patterns, such as divergent trends in upper-and lower-tail inequality-may be related to firm growth. We explore two possible channels: i) wages associated with "routine" job tasks are relatively lower in larger firms due to a higher degree of automation in these firms, and ii) larger firms pay relatively lower entry-level managerial wages in return for providing better career opportunities. Lastly, we document a strong and positive relation between within-country variation in firm growth and rising wage inequality for a broad set of developed countries. In fact, our results suggest that part of what may be perceived as a global trend toward more wage inequality may be driven by an increase in employment by the largest firms in the economy. * We thank Xavier Giroud, Claudia Goldin, and Johannes Stroebel for valuable comments and Raymond Story at Income Data Services (IDS) for help with the data. † NYU Stern School of Business, NBER, CEPR, and ECGI